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INTERACTIVE COMPUTER SERVICE LIABILITY FOR
USER-GENERATED CONTENT AFTER
ROOMMATES. COMt
Bradley M. Smyer*
This Note explores the future of interactive computer service provider (ICSP) liabil-
ity for user-generated content under the Communications Decency Act (CDA) after
Roommates.com II. Roommates.com II held that a housing website was not
entitled to immunity under § 230 of the CDA from federal Fair Housing Act
claims, in part because providing preselected answers to a mandatory question-
naire rendered the site an "information content provider" at least partially
responsible for creation or development of answers. After examining the historical
and legislative oigins of ICSP immunity for user-generated content under 47
U.S. C. § 230, this Note argues that courts should generally evaluate ICSP immu-
nity from claims arising out of both entirely and partially user-generated content
on the basis of whether the ICSP is the sole information content provider Section
230's focus on which party "provides" the essential content and the statutory defi-
nition of "information content provider" support this interpretation. This Note
further argues, however that Congress should amend § 230 to limit immunity in
circumstances where the ICSP is an "information content provider" with respect to
an objectionable housing advertisement and specifically redefine "information con-
tent provider" to include the use of ICSP created dropdown answers to ICSP
required questions. This proposal is narrowly adapted to better serve the purposes
of the Fair Housing Act and § 230 than the current statutory language because it
defines the scope of immunity to balance the conflicting goals of the two statutes.
Interactive computer service providers (ICSPs), such as MySpace
and Facebook, enjoy immunity from claims arising out of entirely
user-generated content under the Communications Decency Act
(CDA). l The CDA states that "[n]o provider ... of an interactive
computer service shall be treated as the publisher or speaker of
any information provided by another information content
provider., 2 Thus, because entirely user-generated content is pro-
vided by an entity other than the ICSP, the ICSP generally enjoys
t The company goes by "Roommate.com" while its web address is pluralized as
"Roommates.com." Note also that the district court case caption is "Roommate.com" while
the en banc opinion is "Roommates.com." For consistency with the cases, this Note refers to
the web entity as "Roommate.com," the district court opinion as "Roommates. com," and the
two circuit opinions respectively as "Roommates.com I" and "Roommates. com I."
* University of Michigan Law School, J.D. 2009; Brigham Young University, B.A.
2006. Note Editor, University of Michigan Journal of Law Reform. Special thanks to Karri Smyer
for her inspiration and support.
1. See 47 U.S.C. § 230(c) (2008).
2. Id.
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immunity from claims related to the content so long as the user-
generator qualifies as an "information content provider."3
Courts have interpreted this immunity broadly.4 The CDA de-
fines an "information content provider" as "any person or entity
that is responsible, in whole or in part, for the creation or devel-
opment of information provided through the Internet or any other
interactive computer service., 5 This generally means that "[u] nder
230(c) ... so long as a third party willingly provides the essential
published content, the interactive service provider receives full
immunity regardless of the specific editing or selection process.,
6
Although ICSPs enjoy immunity from entirely user-generated
content under the CDA, partially user-generated content poses a
more difficult problem. For example, suppose an individual is
seeking a roommate and posts a vacancy on an interactive Internet
site specially suited to match those seeking rental opportunities
with those offering them. Suppose further that the post includes
defamatory, discriminatory, or otherwise illicit information. Al-
though the individual may be subject to liability for the post, the
ICSP would enjoy immunity from claims arising out of this entirely
user-generated content. In contrast, suppose that in completing
the post, the individual is required to select among preprepared
answers to a series of questions. If the answers selected later be-
come the subject of a lawsuit, the individual will most likely be held
liable for the objectionable information, just as in the case of en-
tirely user-generated content. Under current law, however, it is
unclear if the ICSP will also share liability for the content.
In April 2008, the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals arguably
broke with other circuits when it held that CDA immunity did not
apply to user-selected responses to a required questionnaire with
preprepared, dropdown answers.8 The court's analysis, like other
courts that have analyzed this issue,9 focused on whether the ICSP's
level of involvement made it an "information content provider" of
the objectionable information. However, unlike other courts, the
3. Id.
4. See, e.g., Zeran v. Am. Online, Inc., 129 E3d 327, 330 (4th Cir. 1997) ("By its plain
language, § 230 creates a federal immunity to any cause of action that would make service
providers liable for information originating with a third-party user of the service.") (empha-
sis added).
5. 47 U.S.C. § 230(f) (3) (2008).
6. Carafano v. Metrosplash.com, 339 E3d 1119, 1124 (9th Cir. 2003).
7. I use this phrase to refer to a situation where a third party "provides" information
developed in part with the ICSP.
8. Fair Hous. Council of San Fernando Valley v. Roommates.com, L.L.C., 521 E3d
1157,1175-76 (9th Cir. 2008) (en banc) (Roommates.com I).
9. See Carafano, 339 F.3d at 1124; Doe v. Friendfinder Network, Inc., 540 E Supp. 2d
288 (D.N.H. 2008).
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Ninth Circuit found that the ICSP's posing of questions with prese-
lected answers constituted "creation or development" sufficient to
qualify the ICSP as an "information content provider" under the
statute.0 In so holding, the court reversed a district court decision
that had held that Roommate was immune from Fair Housing Act
(FHA) claims via the CDA.1" As commentators have noted:
Prior to the Ninth Circuit Roommate.com H decision, five
[c]ircuits (and many district courts) had interpreted § 230 as
imposing a flat ban on the imposition of liability on the basis
of information provided by third parties. Judge McKeown, in
dissent, stated that the "majority's decision, which sets us apart
from five circuits, contravenes congressional intent and vio-
lates the spirit and serendipity of the internet."
1 2
This Note explores the parameters of ICSP liability for partially
user-generated content under the CDA after Roommates.com II, and
argues that courts should generally evaluate ICSP immunity from
claims arising out of both entirely and partially user-generated con-
tent on the basis of whether the ICSP is the sole information
content provider. This Note further argues, however, that Congress
should amend 47 U.S.C. § 230 to limit immunity in circumstances
where the ICSP is an "information content provider" with respect
to an objectionable housing advertisement and to specify that the
definition of "information content provider" includes an ICSP's
use of ICSP-created dropdown answers to mandatory questions.
Part I discusses common law liability prior to CDA immunity under
§ 230, recounts the legislative and statutory history of § 230, and
illustrates the pre-Roommates.com II interpretation of § 230. Part II
introduces the reasoning of the Roommates. corn line of cases. Part III
identifies problems partially user-generated content poses for
ICSPs who provide preselected answers, argues that Roommates.com
II reached a desirable result, albeit arguably inconsistent with cur-
rent law, and proposes an amended version of § 230 to
10. Roommates.com II, 521 F.3d at 1175-76 (holding that housing website was not enti-
tled to § 230 immunity from federal Fair Housing Act claims, in part because providing
preselected answers to a mandatory questionnaire rendered the site partially responsible for
creation or development of its user's answers). Contra Friendfinder Network, 540 F. Supp. 2d at
306-07 (holding that social network website enjoyed immunity from state law tort claims
because provision of preselected answers to a questionnaire did not amount to creation or
development of content).
11. See Roommates.com I, 521 E3d at 1175-76.
12. Diane J. Klein & Charles Doskow, Housingdiscrimination.com?: The Ninth Circuit
(Mostly) Puts out the Welcome Mat for Fair Housing Act Suits Against Roommate-Matching Websites,
38 GOLDEN GATE U. L. REv. 329, 376-77 (2008).
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acknowledge the competing interests underlying the Roommates.com
H decision. Finally, Part IV concludes by acknowledging the practi-
cal limitations of this thesis and argues that, despite such
limitations, the proposed change to § 230 is preferable to the cur-
rent regime.
I. FROM COMMON LAW TO CURRENT LAW: IMMUNITY
UNDER 47 U.S.C. § 230
A. Common Law Liability Prior to Immunity Under § 230
A defamatory communication tends "to harm the reputation of
another as to lower him in the estimation of the community or to
deter third persons from associating or dealing with him."13 Defa-
mation law developed, in part, as a safety valve to protect against
the physical violence that might ensue without available proper
legal recourse. 4 The tort of defamation continues in modern
American jurisprudence arguably because of the inherent value of
human reputation, I" even as compared to the fundamental free-
dom .of speech. 16 "A defamatory statement is actionable if it is a
false and unprivileged statement of fact that is 'of and concerning'
the plaintiff, and that is published. '"" Liability for defamatory
statements extends to those who contribute to, or distribute, the
actionable comment. 8 Courts attach a level of liability for transmis-
sion or republication depending on whether the third party acted
as a common carrier, distributor, or publisher.' 9 Generally, these
categories represent different degrees of the third party's control
over the objectionable material. 2 For example, primary publishers,
like authors and newspaper editors, are strictly liable for defama-
13. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 559 (1977).
14. Melissa A. Troiano, Comment, The New Journalism?: Why Traditional Defamation Laws
Should Apply to Internet Blogs, 55 AM. U. L. REv. 1447, 1452 (2006) (citing T. BARTON CARTER
ET AL., THE FIRST AMENDMENT AND THE FOURTH ESTATE: THE LAW OF MASS MEDIA 85 (8th
ed. 2001)).
15. Id.
16. See U.S. CONST. amend. I. ("Congress shall make no law.., abridging the freedom
of speech or freedom of the press.").
17. Troiano, supra note 14, at 1452.
18. Id. at 1453 (quoting RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 578 (1977)) ("Except as
to those who only deliver or transmit defamation published by a third person, one who re-
peats or otherwise republishes defamatory matter is subject to liability as if he had originally
published it.").
19. Id. (citingJae Hong Lee, Batzel v. Smith & Barrett v. Rosenthal: Defamation Liability
for Third-Party Content on the Internet, 19 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 469, 471 (2004)).
20. See id.
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tory content.21 Distributors, such as bookstores, are held "liable
only if they knew or had reason to know of the defamatory" con-
tent.2 2 Common carriers, like telephone companies, who simply
transmit the information, "are not generally liable for defamatory
content. 2 3 Courts have applied these traditional categories to vari-
24ous forms of media, including print, radio, and television.
Common law defamation principles "discouraged online entities
from removing offensive Internet" content because exercising edi-
torial control over user-generated content subjected the entity to
"publisher" liability.25 In Stratton Oakmont, Inc. v. Prodigy Services, an
example directly relevant to both the scope and history of § 230,
the court found an Internet service provider operating an Internet
forum was liable as a "publisher" under traditional defamation
26categories. Stratton Oakmont sued Prodigy after an anonymous
user of "Money Talk," an online investment and banking bulletin
board operated by Prodigy, posted defamatory statements about
Stratton Oakmont and its president Daniel Porush
Stratton Oakmont sought partial summary judgment as to
whether Prodigy was a "publisher" of the objectionable state-
ments. 2s The court granted the motion, finding that Prodigy's own
claims regarding editorial control over published material29 and
use of automated screening software 30 constituted a level of control
like that of a publisher under traditional defamation law.31 The
court explicitly recognized that good intentions did not diminish
this level of liability:
21. Id.
22. Id.
23. Id.
24. See id.; Lee, supra note 19, at 486-87 (explaining that although courts initially
struggled in applying traditional defamation liability to these media forms, "traditional ap-
proaches to defamation eventually were reformulated and adapted for the new radio and
television technologies, as had been done with telegrams earlier").
25. Stephen Collins, Saving Fair Housing on the Internet: The Case for Amending the Com-
munications Decency Act, 102 Nw U. L. Rav. 1471, 1480 (2008).
26. Stratton Oakmont, Inc. v. Prodigy Servs. Co., No. 31063/94, 1995 N.Y. Misc. LEXIS
229, at *13-18 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. May 26, 1995).
27. Id. at* 1-2.
28. Id.
29. Id. at *4 ("'We make no apology for pursuing a value system that reflects the cul-
ture of the millions of American families we aspire to serve. Certainly no responsible
newspaper does less when it chooses the type of advertising it publishes, the letters it prints,
the degree of nudity and unsupported gossip its editors tolerate.'").
30. Id. at *5.
31. Id. at *13 ("PRODIGY's conscious choice, to gain the benefits of editorial control,
has opened it up to a greater liability.. ").
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Presumably [Prodigy's] decision to regulate the content of its
bulletin boards was in part influenced by its desire to attract a
[market] perceived to exist consisting of users seeking a "fam-
ily-oriented" computer service. This decision simply required
that to the extent computer networks provide such services,
they must also accept the concomitant legal consequences.32
Although the Prodigy decision represented a principled application
of common law principles to Internet entities, discord soon
emerged regarding the proliferation of indecent material on the
Internet and the disincentives the common law approach created
for entities to conduct any self-regulation of content.
B. Legislative History of § 2363
Dissatisfied with the level of Internet indecency, Senator Exon
introduced the initial version of the bill that eventually became the
CDA in February 1995. 4 He "proposed the CDA as an amendment
to the Federal Telecommunications Act of 1934, '' 5 and maintained
that the amendment was an essential tool to help protect the
American people, especially families and children, from Internet
pornography and indecency.36 He explained, "[t]he information
superhighway should not become a red light district .... Once
[this legislation is] passed, our children and families will be better
protected from those who would electronically cruise the digital
world to engage children in inappropriate communications and
introductions. ,37
The Senate passed Senator Exon's amendment as part of a tele-
38communications reform bill on June 14, 1995. The Exon
amendment altered 47 U.S.C. § 223 by applying regulations to in-
32. Id. at "13-14.
33. This section is primarily based on the excellent published works of Vikas Arora,
Robert Cannon, Jennifer C. Chang and Stephen Collins. See Vikas Arora, Note, The Commu-
nications Decency Act: Congressional Repudiation of the "Right Stuff" 34 HARV. J. ON LEGIS. 473,
479-80, 483-86 (1997); Robert Cannon, The Legislative History of Senator Exon's Communica-
tions Decency Act: Regulating Barbarians on the Information Superhighway, 49 FED. COMM. L.J. 51,
64-73 (1996);Jennifer C. Chang, Note, In Search of Fair Housing in Cyberspace: The Implications
of the Communications Decency Act for Fair Housing on the Internet, 55 STAN. L. REV. 969, 988-94
(2002); Collins, supra note 25, at 1479-83.
34. S. 314, 104th Cong. (1995); 141 CONG. REc. S1920 (daily ed. Feb. 1, 1995); see also
Arora, supra note 33, at 479-80.
35. See Arora, supra note 33, at 479.
36. See 141 CONG. REc. S8087 (daily ed.June 9, 1995).
37. Cannon, supra note 33, at 53 (quoting 141 CONG. REC. S1953 (daily ed. Feb. 1,
1995)).
38. See 141 CONG. REc. S8347 (daily ed.June 14, 1995).
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teractive computer services analogous to those that had applied to
obscene telephone calls.39 The amendment indicated that it was
unlawful, inter alia, to:
[K] nowingly... send to or display to a person under 18 years
of age, any comment, request, suggestion, proposal, image, or
other communication that, in context, depicts or describes, in
terms patently offensive as measured by contemporary com-
munity standards, sexual or excretory activities or organs,
regardless of whether the user of such service placed the call
or initiated the communication.0
Also dissatisfied with the proliferation of indecency on the
Internet, Representatives Christopher Cox and Ron Wyden intro-
duced the bill that later became § 230 in the House during the
summer of 1995. 4' The section was introduced as the "Online Fam-
ily Empowerment" amendment to the telecommunications bill
then pending before the House.2 Both Congressmen advocated
the Cox-Wyden amendment as a means of reducing the amount of
pornographic materials available to children via the Internet.
4
.3
Other Representatives expressed similar concerns about the quan-
tity and accessibility of obscene Internet materials.44
The Cox-Wyden amendment gained support from persons with
numerous rationales, including:
39. Cannon, supra note 33, at 57-58; see also 47 U.S.C.A. § 223 (West 2008) (imposing
liability for "[o]bscene or harassing telephone calls in the District of Columbia or in inter-
state or foreign communications").
40. See Collins, supra note 25, at 1479 (quoting 47 U.S.C. § 223(d)(1)(B) (Supp. II
1997)). Although the Exon Amendment to 47 U.S.C. § 223 eventually became law, the Su-
preme Court later found this section of the CDA unconstitutional. See id. (citing Reno v.
ACLU, 521 U.S. 844, 882 (1997) ("The CDA [47 U.S.C. § 223] places an unacceptably heavy
burden on protected speech, and ... the defenses do not constitute the sort of 'narrow
tailoring' that will save an otherwise patently invalid unconstitutional provision.")). Compare
47 U.S.C. § 223(d) (1) (B) (Supp. 111997), with 47 U.S.C.A. § 223 (West 2008).
41. See 141 CONG. REc. H8468 (daily ed. Aug. 4, 1995).
42. See Chang, supra note 33, at 988.
43. Representative Cox explained, "[a] s the parent of two, I want to make sure that my
children have access to this future [represented by the Internet] and that I do not have to
worry about what they might be running into on line. I would like to keep that [offensive
material] out of my house and off of my computer." Chang, supra note 33, at 988 (2002)
(quoting 141 CONG. REc. H8469 (daily ed. Aug. 4, 1995) (statement of Rep. Cox)). Repre-
sentative Wyden opened his remarks on the amendment by saying, "[w]e are all against
smut and pornography, and, as the parents of two small computer-literate children, my wife
and I have seen our kids find their way into these chat rooms that make their middle-aged
parents cringe." Id. (citing 141 CONG. Rac. H8470 (daily ed. Aug. 4, 1995) (statement of
Rep. Wyden)).
44. See Chang, supra note 33, at 988 & n.81.
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[C]oncern about the exposure of children to obscene online
material, opposition to the Senate's heavy-handed federal
regulatory approach to obscenity on the Internet, and con-
cern that the approach taken in recent common law
defamation cases [particularly the Prodigy ruling] would dis-
courage [online service providers] from actively screening out
indecent material.45
Representative Wyden emphatically acknowledged that the Cox-
Wyden amendment "stands in sharp contrast to the work of the
other body."4 6 Unlike the Exon Amendment, the Cox-Wyden ap-
proach eschewed additional regulations and restrictions on
interactive computer services by expanding "federal government
regulation of the Internet" and broadening "the role of the Fed-
eral Communications Commission (FCC) . Members of the
House feared that the Exon Amendment's solution to the Internet
indecency problem would be inefficient, ineffective, and detrimen-
tal to continued Internet growth.
Representative Wyden explained:
In my view that approach, the approach of the [Senate], will
essentially involve the Federal Government spending vast
sums of money trying to define elusive terms that are going to
lead to a flood of legal challenges while our kids are unpro-
tected.... [N]ot even a Federal Internet censorship army
would give our Government the power to keep offensive ma-
terial out of the hands of children ....
Representative Cox also emphasized the undesirability of the
regulatory approach: "[i]f we regulate the Internet at the FCC, that
will freeze or at least slow down technology. It will threaten the fu-
ture of the Internet. That is why it is so important that we not have
45. Id. at 988.
46. 141 CONG. REc. H8470 (daily ed. Aug. 4, 1995) (statement of Rep. Wyden).
47. See Chang, supra note 33, at 989-91.
48. Id. at 989; Cannon, supra note 33, at 67 ("The younger House ... wanted nothing
of the [Exon approach] and sought to distance itself from the appearance of a regulatory-
hungry federal government ready to trample the prized freedoms found in cyberspace.").
49. See 141 CONG. REC. H8470 (daily ed. Aug. 4, 1995) (statement of Rep. Wyden); see
also Chang, supra note 41, at 989 & n.84 (citing Cyberporn: Protecting Our Children from the Back
Alleys of the Internet: Hearing Before the H. Subcomms. on Basic Research and Technology of the
Comm. on Science, 104th Cong. 82 (1995) [hereinafter Cyberporn Hearing] (statement of
Stephen M. Heaton, General Counsel, CompuServe, Inc.) ("The cyber community, made up
of hundreds of thousands of computers distributed across the globe is truly a world without
borders. Directly regulating cyberspace-history's only true functioning anarchy-may
prove impossible.")).
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a Federal computer commission do that., 50 Other Members of
Congress, foreshadowing the Supreme Court ruling two years in
the future, expressed concern that the Senate's approach might
also unconstitutionally limit free speech."
Supporters of the Cox-Wyden amendment believed that encour-
aging the private sector to employ blocking, filtering, and
screening technologies posed a more efficient and less intrusive
solution to the Internet obscenity problem . Witnesses testified
that private filtering technology was available, effective, and lessintrsivetha theSenae • 53
intrusive than the Senate alternative. Representative Wyden stated
his agreement: "[w]e are here to say that we believe that parents
and families are better suited to guard the portals of cyberspace
and protect our children than our Government bureaucrats." 4
Representative Cox also explained: "[w] e want to encourage peo-
ple like Prodigy, like CompuServe, like America Online ... to do
everything possible for us, the customer, to help us control ...
what comes in and what our children see."55
Proponents of the Cox-Wyden amendment also felt that
traditional common law principles, by imposing liability on entities
that voluntarily edited Internet content, discouraged the desired
-56type of private action. Representative Cox explained that "the
existing legal system provides a massive disincentive for the people
",57who might best help us control the Internet to do so.
Representative Cox specifically criticized the approach taken by
the Prodigy court as unwisely punishing ICSPs for trying to mitigate
50. See Chang, supra note 33, at 989 (citing 141 CONG. REC. H8471 (daily ed. Aug. 4,
1995) (statement of Rep. Cox)).
51. See, e.g., id. at 989 (citing 141 CONG. REc. H8471 (daily ed. Aug. 4, 1995) (state-
ment of Rep. Lofgren) (endorsing the Cox-Wyden amendment and stating that "I would
urge its approval so that we preserve the first amendment and open systems on the Net.")).
See also Cannon, supra note 33, at 67 ("On June 20, 1995, Speaker Gingrich pronounced that
the CDA 'is clearly a violation of free speech and it's a violation of the right of adults to
communicate with each other.'").
52. See Chang, supra note 33, at 990.
53. Id. at 990 (citing Cyberporn Hearing, supra note 49 (statement of Stephen M.
Heaton, General Counsel, CompuServe, Inc.) (testifying that existing laws on indecency
.are more than adequate" for the Internet, and that the role of government should be "to
encourage the development.., of new technologies that empower parents in shaping their
children's experiences in cyberspace.")).
54. Chang, supra note 33, at 990 (citing 141 CONG. REc. H8470 (daily ed. Aug. 4,
1995) (statement of Rep. Wyden)).
55. Id. at 990 (citing 141 CONG. REC. H8470 (daily ed. Aug. 4, 1995) (statement of
Rep. Cox)); see also id. (citing 141 CONG. REc. H8470-71 (statement of Rep. Lofgren) ("Sena-
tor Exon's approach is not the right way.... The private sector is out giving parents the tools
that they have.")).
56. See Chang, supra note 33, at 990.
57. 141 CONG. REc. H8469 (daily ed. Aug. 4, 1995) (statement of Rep. Cox); see also
Chang, supra note 33, at 991.
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Internet obscenity.5 As discussed supra, the Prodigy court found that
sufficient control over an Internet service's bulletin board, even if
that control is exercised screening objectionable content,
subjected the service to publisher's liability for the defamatory
content.5 9 To correct what the Cox-Wyden amendment advocates
viewed as a case law principle incompatible with the most favorable
solution,0  the amendment included a "Good Samaritan"
protection:
This section provides "Good Samaritan" protections from civil
liability for providers or users of an interactive computer ser-
vice for actions to restrict or to enable restriction of access to
objectionable online material. One of the specific purposes of
this section is to overrule Stratton-Oakmont [sic] v. Prodigy and
any other similar decisions which have treated such providers
and users as publishers or speakers of content that is not their
own because they have restricted access to objectionable ma-
terial.6'
The House passed the Cox-Wyden Amendment on August 4,
1995 with overwhelming support,6 and the amendment was even-
tually codified as 47 U.S.C. § 230. The "Good Samaritan" section,
as codified in the statute, specifies that "[n] o provider or user of an
interactive computer service shall be treated as the publisher or
speaker of any information provided by another information con-
tent provider.""2
58. See Chang, supra note 33, at 990 (quoting CONG. REc. H8469 (daily ed. Aug. 4,
1995) (statement of Rep. Cox) ("The court said ... 'You ... are going to face higher,
stricker [sic] liability because you tried to exercise some control over offensive material.' Mr.
Chairman, that is backward.")).
59. See Stratton Oakmont, Inc. v. Prodigy Servs. Co., No. 31063/94, 1995 N.Y. Misc.
LEXIS 229, at *13 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. May 26, 1995) ("PRODIGY's conscious choice, to gain the
benefits of editorial control, has opened it up to a greater liability....").
60. See, e.g., Chang, supra note 33, at 991 n.95 (citing 141 CONG. REc. H8471 (daily ed.
Aug. 4, 1995) (statement of Rep. Goodlatte) ("There is no way that any of those entities, like
Prodigy, can take the responsibility to edit out information that is going to be coming in to
them from all manner of sources onto their bulletin board.... [A]nd to have that imposi-
tion imposed on them is wrong.").
61. H.R. REP. No. 104-458, at 194 (1996) (Conf. Rep.); see also Chang, supra note 33, at
992 (quoting id. and explaining the rationale behind the "Good Samaritan" exception).
62. See 141 CONG. REc. H8478-79 (daily ed. Aug. 4, 1995) (vote totals of 420-to-4).
63. 47 U.S.C. § 230(c)(1) (2008).
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C. Case Law Interpretation of § 230
Shortly after the CDA's enactment in 1996, the Fourth Circuit
Court of Appeals interpreted the service provider immunity cre-
ated by § 230 in Zeran v. America Online.64 In Zeran, an anonymous
user posted advertisements for "Naughty Oklahoma T-Shirts," in
reference to the 1995 Oklahoma City bombing, and urged parties
to telephone "Ken" at Zeran's number.65 Plaintiff Zeran received "a
high volume" of angry, derogatory, and threatening phone calls
from those appalled by the morbid audacity of the advertisement. 6
Zeran informed America Online (AOL) of the situation and was
told that AOL would delete the anonymous user's account and of-
fensive postings.67 However, an anonymous user repeatedly posted
the offensive advertisements and Zeran received an increased vol-
ume of calls.68 Reportedly, just five days after the original posting,
the calls were so frequent that at times Zeran received "an abusive
phone call approximately every two minutes., 69 Zeran argued that
AOL was liable for distributing the "defamatory speech" contained
in the subsequent advertisements after learning of its defamatory
character.70
The Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals rejected arguments that
AOL was subject to any publisher liability. The court found that
§ 230 prevented Zeran's claims: "By its plain language, § 230
creates a federal immunity to any cause of action that would make
service providers liable for information originating with a third-
party user of the service." 7' The court also rejected Zeran's argu-
ment that even if the statute did forbid publisher liability, it did not
immunize AOL against distributor liability.7 2 The court noted that
distributor liability "is merely a subset, or a species, of publisher
liability, and is therefore also foreclosed by [the language and pur-
poses of] § 230" and that imposing such liability would chill
Internet speech, discourage "self-regulation," and increase the
burden on computer service providers.73
64. 129 E3d 327 (4th Cir. 1997).
65. Id. at 329.
66. See id.
67. Id.
68. Id.
69. Id.
70. Id. at 330.
71. Id. (emphasis added).
72. Id. at 331-33.
73. Id. at 332.
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Although Zeran's broad application of § 230 has been highly• ° • 74
criticized, most courts have followed Zeran "despite the level of
involvement an ISP has in the defamatory or otherwise offensive
material."'75 Courts "have applied Zeran's reasoning to bar not only
defamation claims, but other tort causes of action asserted against
interactive service providers." 76 Courts have even found that im-
munity under § 230 applied when the provider had some
participation in creating the content.
77
In 2003, the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals held in Carafano
that § 230 immunized Matchmaker, a "commercial Internet dating
service," from a plaintiffs claims of identity theft, defamation, neg-
ligence, and misappropriation after an anonymous third party
created a false profile using the plaintiffs name and contact in-
formation.7 ' The Carafano court specifically rejected the theory that
Matchmaker's questionnaire, consisting of multiple choice and es-.
say questions, made the service a content provider under the
CDA.79 The court noted that "[u] nder 230(c) ... so long as a third
party willingly provides the essential published content, the inter-
active service provider receives full immunity regardless of the
specific editing or selection process."8° The court continued:
74. See Chang, supra note 41, at 995-97 (analyzing the Zeran decision and questioning
the court's assumption that distributor liability is inconsistent with the purposes of the stat-
ute); see also Doe v. Am. Online, Inc., 783 So. 2d 1010, 1020 (Fla. 2001) (Lewis, J.,
dissenting) ("While the initial foray into Zeran's analysis is thus promising, its eventual con-
clusion-and thus, the majority's corresponding conclusion in this case, patterned on the
analyses contained in the two Zeran decisions-is, in my view, a startling non sequitur. Con-
trary to case law which has traditionally recognized an important difference between
distributor and publisher liability, the majority opinion rejects any such distinc-
tion... "(citations omitted)); Christopher Butler, Plotting the Return of an Ancient Tort to
Cyberspace: Towards a New Federal Standard of Responsibility for Defamation for Internet Service Pro-
viders, 6 MICH. TELECOMM. & TECH. L. REv. 247, 253 (2000) ("The [Zeran] court
circumvented the publisher/distributor dichotomy.... ."); Michael H. Spencer, Defamatory E-
mail and Employer Liability: Why Razing Zeran v. America Online Is a Good Thing, 6 RICH. J.L.
& TECH. 25, 13 (2000), http://www.richmond.edu/jolt/v6i5/article4.html (on file with
the University of Michigan Journal of Law Reform) ("This judicial legislating, though noble
in its foresight, nevertheless falls outside of the parameters of the judge's role in society. As a
result of the court's retooling of defamation law, other courts have followed this dangerous,
diverging path.").
75. Sarah Duran, Hear No Evil, See No Evil, Spread No Evil: Creating a Unified Legislative
Approach to Internet Service Provider Immunity, 12 U. BALT. INTELL. PROP. L.J. 115, 123 (2004).
76. Gentry v. eBay, Inc., 121 Cal. Rptr. 2d 703, 714 (Ct. App. 2002); Kathleen R. v. City
of Livermore, 104 Cal. Rptr. 2d 772, 776-77 (Ct. App. 2001).
77. See Carafano v. Metrosplash.com, 339 F.3d 1119, 1124 (9th Cir. 2003) (holding that
an Internet dating website was not responsible for user profile information "formulated in
response to Matchmaker's questionnaire").
78. Id. at 1121-22.
79. Id.
80. Id.
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The fact that some of the content was formulated in response
to Matchmaker's questionnaire does not alter this conclusion.
Doubtless, the questionnaire facilitated the expression of in-
formation by individual users. However, the selection of the
content was left exclusively to the user. The actual profile "in-
formation" consisted of the particular options chosen and the
additional essay answers provided. Matchmaker was not re-
sponsible, even in part, for associating certain multiple choice
responses with a set of physical characteristics, a group of es-
say answers, and a photograph. Matchmaker cannot be
considered an "information content provider" under the stat-
ute because no profile has any content until a user actively
creates it.81
In coming to its conclusion, the Carafano decision drew heavily
on Gentry v. eBay, Inc., a California state case decided the year be-
fore. In that case, plaintiff buyers claimed that eBay violated
California's Autographed Sports Memorabilia statute, and was neg-
ligent and engaged in unfair business practices based, inter alia, on
its practice of ranking sellers whose profiles contained faulty in-
formation, "permitting other false representations to be placed on
its web site, and making its own false or misleading representa-
tions." 83 The trial court denied plaintiffs' claims based, in part, on
the service provider's immunity under § 230.84 The California
Court of Appeals affirmed the trial court's decision.8 5 Particularly,
the court of appeals rejected the plaintiffs' argument that eBay's
ranking system based on fallacious comments made it an "informa-
86tion content provider" under the statute .
The Carafano court explained that, as in Gentry, "the fact that
Matchmaker classifies user characteristics into discrete categories
and collects responses to specific essay questions does not
transform Matchmaker into a 'developer' of the 'underlying misin-
formation.' ,7 The court also dismissed Carafano's contentions that
Matchmaker's set of "preprepared responses" meaningfully made
the service provider an 'information content provider' under the
statute.88
81. Id.
82. Gentry v. eBay, Inc., 121 Cal. Rptr. 2d 703 (Ct. App. 2002).
83. Id. at 706.
84. Id. at 706-09.
85. Id. at 706, 716, 718-19.
86. Id. at 718-19.
87. Carafano v. Metrosplash.com, 339 F.3d 1119, 1124 (9th Cir. 2003).
88. Id. at 1125 ("Carafano responds that Matchmaker contributes much more
structure and content than eBay by asking 62 detailed questions and providing a menu of
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Courts have also found that § 230 barred claims under the Fair
Housing Act (FHA).S9 In Chicago Lawyers' Committee for Civil Rights
Under the Law v. Craigslist, the court held that CDA immunity under
§ 230 extended to Internet service providers that publish discrimi-
natory housing advertisements.9" Plaintiff, a civil rights group, filed
suit against Craigslist, a popular Internet forum for posting various
types of advertisements, alleging that Craigslist violated § 3604(c)
of the FHA by publishing discriminatory housing advertisements. 9'
Plaintiff argued that § 230(c) (1)92 was merely definitional and did
not itself grant immunity for discriminatory housing advertise-
ments.93 Defendant argued that the court should apply the
prevailing interpretation first articulated in Zeran, and find the de-
fendant immune from suit under § 230.94 The court rejected both
interpretations, however, before it granted "Craigslist's Rule 12(c)
motion for judgment on the pleadings., 95 Noting that Zeran and its
progeny interpreted CDA immunity far too expansively than was
warranted by the "plain meaning" of § 230(c) (1), 9' the court ex-
plained that the section would merely "prohibit [an ICSP's]
treatment as a publisher .... , Thus, § 230 "would bar any cause of
action that requires ... a finding that an [ICSP] published third-
party content."98 In contrast to the holding in Zeran, the Craigslist
court interpreted § 230(c) (1) only to "[bar] any claim that requires
'publishing' as an element."99 Nevertheless, because § 3604(c) of the
'pre-prepared responses.' However, this is a distinction of degree rather than of kind, and
Matchmaker still lacks responsibility for the 'underlying misinformation."').
89. See Chi. Lawyers' Comm. for Civ. Rights Under the Law, Inc. v. Craigslist, Inc., 461
F. Supp. 2d 681 (N.D. 11. 2006). The Fair Housing Act makes it unlawful to "make, print, or
publish, or cause to be made, printed, or published any notice, statement, or advertisement,
with respect to the sale or rental of a dwelling that indicates any preference, limitation, or
discrimination based on race, color, religion, sex, handicap, familial status, or national ori-
gin, or an intention to make any such preference, limitation, or discrimination." 42 U.S.C.
§ 3604(c) (2008); see also Collins, supra note 25, at 1488-91 (analyzing this case in the con-
text of congressional amendment to § 230).
90. Craigslist, 461 F. Supp. 2d at 698.
91. Id. at 682-86.
92. 47 U.S.C. § 230 (c)(1) (2008) ("No provider or user of an interactive computer ser-
vice shall be treated as the publisher or speaker of any information provided by another
information content provider.").
93. Craigslist, 461 F. Supp. 2d at 692.
94. Id.
95. Id. at 692, 699.
96. Id. at 695.
97. Id. at 696.
98. d.
99. Id. at 698.
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FHA requires that the material be "made, printed, or published,"
100
Craigslist was still immune under § 230(c) (1).101
The Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed, explaining that,
while Congress did not consider potential conflicts between the
FHA and the CDA, "§ 230(c) (1) is general .... [It] covers ads for
housing, auctions of paintings that may have been stolen by Nazis,
biting comments about steroids in baseball, efforts to verify the
truth of politicians' promises, and everything else that third parties
may post on a web site .... ,, 0 Thus, even though the court ex-
pressed some concern about how broadly § 230 had been
interpreted following Zeran, it ultimately concluded that § 230
barred claims under the FHA.
II. Roommates.com I: A NEW INTERPRETATION OF § 230?
A. Background: the Website, the District Court, and the Circuit Court
Most people have preferences when selecting a potential room-
mate.1 03 However, some preferences are more suspect than others
0 4
and others are prohibited by the FHA.10 5 Suppose a person looking
100. 42 U.S.C. § 3 6 0 4(c) (2008).
101. Craigslist, 461 F. Supp. 2d at 698; see also Collins, supra note 25, at 1488-89 ("Liabil-
ity under § 3604(c) requires that the OSP be a publisher; therefore, Craigslist was immune
from liability for discriminatory housing advertisements that originated from third-party
users.").
102. Collins, supra note 25, at 1489 (quoting Chi. Lawyers' Comm. for Civil Rights Un-
der the Law v. Craigslist, Inc., 519 E3d 666, 666, 671 (7th Cir. 2008)).
103. Klein and Doskow present an illustrative hypothetical regarding a possible Internet
housing search scenario. See Klein & Doskow, supra note 12, at 331.
104. Examples of some of the suspect preferences expressed by Roommates.com's users
include: "looking for an ASIAN FEMALE OR EURO GIRL"; "I'm looking for a straight
Christian male"; "I am not looking for freaks, geeks, prostitutes (male or female), druggies,
pet cobras, drama, black muslims or mortgage brokers"; and "Here is free rent for the right
woman .... I would prefer to have a Hispanic female roommate so she can make me fluent
in Spanish or an Asian female roommate just because I love Asian females." Fair Hous.
Council of San Fernando Valley v. Roommate.com, LLC, No. CV 03-09386 PA (RZx), 2004
U.S. Dist. LEXIS 27987, at *5-6 (C.D. Cal. Sept. 30, 2004) (Roommates.com).
105. It is important to note that § 3604(a), (b), and (f) of the FHA prohibit "discrimi-
nation in selling or renting a dwelling (or in the terms and conditions of such sale or
rental), on the basis of race, color, religion, sex, familial status, national origin, or handicap.
However, under § 3603(b) persons renting out a room or unit of an owner-occupied build-
ing of [four] families or fewer (including persons seeking a 'roommate,' typically in an
apartment) are exempt from these requirements." Klein & Doskow, supra note 12, at 334-35
(citations omitted). But, even in these otherwise exempted situations, it is still unlawful "[t]o
make, print, or publish, or cause to be made, printed, or published any notice, statement, or
advertisement, with respect to the sale or rental of a dwelling that indicates any preference,
limitation, or discrimination based on race, color, religion, sex, handicap, familial status, or
national origin, or an intention to make any such preference, limitation, or discrimination."
42 U.S.C. § 3604(c) (2008); see also Klein & Doskow, supra note 12, at 335.
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for a roommate decides to advertise via Roommates.com. The web-
site boasts information for more than 80,000 potential roommates,
and makes the information available to registered users.1°6 Initial
registration includes selecting a location and indicating whether a
room is available or one is sought, and allows the user to view avail-
able rooms or roommates.' °7 The user must create an account to
"proceed further and contact potential roommates."' °s Creating an
account for a room-seeker begins by indicating room preferences,
including desired location, dwelling type, rent, length of lease, and
shared room preferences.' °9 The user must then indicate room-
mate preferences from a dropdown menu, including "age, gender,
sexual orientation, smoking habits, cleanliness, pets, and familial
status (whether or not they have children).'""° The user must also
provide this same information regarding himself..' A user must
provide information for all questions to create an account. 112 Users
also create their own nicknames, attach photographs, and add an
"Additional Comments" essay "describing themselves and their
roommate preferences.""
13
Creating an account for a roommate-seeker similarly begins by
indicating location, dwelling type, and rent." 4 Specific information
about the household is also required, "including the age range,
sexual orientation, and occupation of the current household
members." 5 The registrant must also indicate the criteria for find-
ing a potential roommate from the same dropdown menu as those
seeking rooms, and is also "encouraged to personalize" their ac-
count by adding "Additional Comments."" 6 Roommate-seekers find
roommates in one of three ways: the website automatically gener-
ates "My Matches" based on desired roommate characteristics,"7 a
user may conduct a "Power Search" for roommates by searching
106. Roommate Matching Service Home Page, http://www.roommates.com (on file
with the University of Michigan Journal of Law Reform).
107. Id.; see Roommates.com, 2004 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 27987, at *3-4 (describing the Room-
mates.com registration process); Bradford J. Sayler, Amplifying Illegality: Using the Exception to
the CDA Immunity Carved out by Fair Housing Council of San Fernando Valley v. Room-
mates.com to Combat Abusive Editing Tactics, 16 GEO. MASON L. REv. 203, 205-07 (2008)
(explaining the registration and account creating process in exhaustive detail).
108. See Sayler, supra note 107, at 205.
109. Id.
110. Id. at 205-06.
111. Id. at 206.
112. Id.
113. Fair Hous. Council of San Fernando Valley v. Roomate.com, No. CV 03-09386 PA
(RZx), 2004 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 27987, at *3 (C.D. Cal. Sept. 30, 2004) (Roommates.com).
114. See Sayler, supra note 107, at 206.
115. Id.
116. Id.
117. Id.
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according to new preferences, 8 or a user may also opt for "Email
Notification" when a new user with compatible criteria registers."'
In Roommates.com, the plaintiffs, two civil rights groups, alleged
that "Roommate is liable for making and publishing 'discriminatory
statements that indicate preferences based on race, religion, na-
tional origin, general familial status, age, sexual orientation, source
of income, and disability, all in violation of fair housing laws.' ,1
20
Roommate.com claimed that it was "immune from suit pursuant to
section 230 of the [CDA]" because the plaintiffs sought to "make it
liable for the publication of content provided by third parties."
12 1
Both parties sought summary judgment.122 The plaintiffs argued that
Roommate.com violated "state and federal housing laws" by allowing
123users to select potentially-suspect nicknames and draft "free form
essays ... which indicate at least potentially discriminatory prefer-
ences,"' 24 and by requiring questionnaire answers that disclosed a
user's "age, gender, sexual orientation, occupation, and familial
status." 125 Roommate.com argued that it was "entitled to the grant of
immunity provided by the CDA notwithstanding any potential viola-
tions of the fair housing laws."
26
After noting that "It]his is apparently the first case to address
the relationship between the CDA's grant of immunity and the
FHA's imposition of liability for the imposition of liability for the
making or publishing of discriminatory real estate listings," the
court granted Roommate.com's motion for summary judgment. 127
The court explained that because the "FHA is not among the types
of laws which are specifically exempted from the CDA," it could
not unilaterally create an exception for the fair housing laws with-
out evidence of legislative intent. 28 The court concluded: "In the
absence of contrary legislative intent, therefore, the Court finds
that the CDA applies to shield Roommate from liability for the
FHA violations alleged by Plaintiffs to the extent that Plaintiffs seek
to make Roommate liable for the content provided by its users.'
29
118. Id.
119. Id.at206-07.
120. Fair Hous. Council of San Fernando Valley v. Roomate.com, No. CV 03-09386 PA
(RZx), 2004 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 27987, at *1-2 (C.D. Cal. Sept. 30, 2004) (Roommates.com).
121. Id. at*2.
122. Id. at*1.
123. Id. at *5. ("These nicknames include: ChristianGrl, CatholicGirl, Asianpride,
Asianmale, Whiteboy, Chinesegirl, Latinpride, and Blackguy.").
124. Id. at "5. See supra note 104.
125. Id.
126. Id.
127. Id. at *7-8, *15.
128. Id. at *8.
129. Id. at *8-9.
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The court then explained that Ninth Circuit precedent "com-
pels the conclusion that Roommate cannot be liable for violating
the FHA arising out of the nicknames chosen by its users, the free-
form comments provided by the users, or the users' responses to
the multiple choice questionnaire. ' 's ° After noting that "an 'inter-
active computer service' qualifies for immunity so long as it does
not also function as an 'information content provider' for the por-
tion of the statement or publication at issue,'' the court drew
analogy between the questionnaire used by Roommate.com and
the one used by Matchmaker in Carafano.1
32
Both questionnaires consisted of both multiple choice and essay
questions.133 Then relying on the Carafano court's conclusion that
Matchmaker could not be "considered an 'information content pro-
vider' under the statute because no profile has any content under
the statute until a user actively creates it,"' 34 the court concluded that
the plaintiffs' "FHA claim [was] barred by the immunity provision of
the CDA."'35
The Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals partially reversed and re-
manded. 3 6 The majority agreed with the district court that
Roommate.com was not an "information content provider" with re-
gard to information contained in the "Additional Comments"
section of a user's profile.'37 In this section, Roommate.com advised
its users: "[w] e strongly recommend taking a moment to personalize
your profile by writing a paragraph or two describing yourself and
what you are looking for in a roommate." 38 Although these "free
form" essays "produce [d] the most provocative and revealing infor-
mation in many user's profiles,' 39 the open-ended question
"suggests no particular information that is to be provided by mem-
bers" and so Roommate.com did not qualify as an "information
content provider."'40
130. Id. at*12.
131. Id. at*9 (quoting Carafano, 339 F.3d 1119, 1123 (9th Cir. 2003)).
132. See id.; see also supra discussion of Carafano.
133. Id.
134. Id. at *10 (quoting Carafano, 339 F.3d 1119, 1124 (9th Cir. 2003)).
135. Id. at*12.
136. Fair Hous. Council of San Fernando Valley v. Roommates.com, L.L.C., 489 F.3d
921,930 (9th Cir. 2007) (Roommates.corn 1).
137. Id. at929.
138. Id. at 932. (ReinhardtJ., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
139. Id. at 929 ("Some state that they 'Pref[er] white Male roommates,' while others de-
clare that they are 'NOT looking for black muslims.' Some don't want to deal with
annoyances such as 'drugs, kids or animals' or 'smokers, kids or druggies,' while others want
to stay away from 'psychos or anyone on mental medication.'"); see also id. at 929 n. 10 ("The
female we are looking for hopefully wont [sic] mind having a little sexual incounter [sic]
with my boyfriend and I [very sic]."); id. at 929 n.l ("We are 3 Christian females who Love
our Lord Jesus Christ.... We have weekly bible studies and bi-weekly times of fellowship.").
140. Id. at 929.
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The court, however, concluded that Roommate.com was an "in-
formation content provider" with regard to preferences selected in
response to its mandatory questionnaire and its publication and dis-
tribution such preferences.14 ' First, the court explained that because
a user must chose among preprepared answers to a number of
mandatory questions, and because those questions and answers were
prepared by Roommate.com, Roommate.com is "'responsible"' for
these questionnaires because it "creat[ed] or develop[ed]" the
forms and answer choices.142 Second, the court reasoned that the
CDA did not exempt Roommate.corn "from liability for publishing
and distributing its members' profiles, which it generates from their
answers to the form questionnaires.' In coming to this conclusion,
the court distinguished Carafano, stating:
The prankster in Carafano provided information that was not
solicited by the operator of the website .... Carafano did not
consider whether the CDA protected such websites, and we do
not read that opinion as granting CDA immunity to those who
actively encourage, solicit and profit from the tortious and
unlawful communications of others.
44
Therefore, by requesting and compiling the potentially unlawful in-
formation, 14 "Roommate provides an additional layer of information
that it is 'responsible' at least 'in part' for creating or developing."
146
141. Id. at 926-27.
142. Id. at 926 ("Individuals looking for a room must first complete a form about them-
selves. They must use a drop-down menu to identify themselves as either 'Male' or 'Female'
and to disclose whether 'Children will be present' or 'Children will not be present.' Individuals
looking to rent out a room must complete a similar form. They must use a check-box menu to
indicate whether 'Straight male(s),' 'Gay male(s),' 'Straight female(s),' and/or 'Lesbian(s)'
now live in the household, and a drop-down menu to disclose if there are 'Children present' or
'Children not present.' If users fail to provide answers to any of these questions, they cannot
complete the membership registration process. In addition to completing one of the two forms
described above, all prospective members must fill out the 'My Roommate Preferences' form.
They must use a drop-down menu to indicate whether they are willing to live with 'Straight or
gay' males, only 'Straight' males, only 'Gay' males, or 'No males,' or may choose to select a
blank response. Users must make comparable selections for females. They must also declare 'I
will live with children,' 'I will not live with children' or change the field to a blank.").
143. Id. at 927 ("We are not convinced that Carafano would control in a situation where
defamatory, private or otherwise tortious or unlawful information was provided by users in
direct response to questions and prompts from the operator of the website.").
144. Id. at 928.
145. See id. ("Thus, Roommate allows members to search only the profiles of members
with compatible preferences.").
146. Id.
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B. Roommates.com II: The Ninth Circuit En Banc Opinion
Roommate.com was granted rehearing en banc on October 12,
2007.147 On rehearing, the majority held that Roommate.com was
an "information content provider" as to the prepopulated answers
to its mandatory questions and as well as its compilation and use of
those answers. 4 With regard to the mandatory questions, the court
explained:
Roommate created the questions and choice of answers, and
designed its website registration process around them. There-
fore, Roommate is undoubtedly the "information content
provider" as to the questions and can claim no immunity for
posting them on its website, or for forcing subscribers to an-
swer them as a condition of using its services.... Roommate's
own acts-posting the questionnaire and requiring answers to
it-are entirely its doing and thus section 230 of the CDA
does not apply to them. Roommate is entitled to no immu-
nity149
The court also reasoned that Roommate.com was an "informa-
tion content provider" with regard to its use of its users'
preferences. As explained above, Roommate.com required its users
to select among preprepared answers to mandatory questions. 50
These answers provided potentially discriminatory preferences, as
illustrated above."" Roommate.com then used this "information to
channel subscribers away from listing where the individual offering
housing has expressed preferences that aren't compatible with the
subscriber's answers.' '152 The court first explained that Room-
mate.com was clearly an "information content provider" under the
CDA, and hence not eligible for immunity, because it was at least a
partial creator or developer of content.1' The majority explained:
147. Fair Hous. Council of San Fernando Valley v. Roommates.com, LLC, 506 F.3d 716
(9th Cir. 2007) (Roommates.com 1).
148. Fair Hous. Council of San Fernando Valley v. Roommates.com, LLC, 521 F.3d
1157, 1165, 1169-70 (9th Cir. 2008) (en banc) (Roommates.com II).
149. Id. at 1164-65.
150. See, e.g., id. at 1165.
151. See id.
152. Id.
153. Id. at 1165, 1167 ("By an) reasonable use of the English language, Roommate is
'responsible' at least 'in part' for each subscriber's profile page, because every such page is a
collaborative effort between Roommate and the subscriber.").
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By requiring subscribers to provide the information as a condi-
tion of accessing its service, and by providing a limited set of
pre-populated answers, Roommate becomes much more than a
passive transmitter of information provided by others; it be-
comes the developer, at least in part, of that information. And
section 230 provides immunity only if the interactive computer
service does not "creat[e] or develop[ ]" the information "in
whole or in part.
'
,
1
5
4
Similarly, the majority concluded that Roommate.com was not
entitled to CDA immunity for the content because its use of filter-
ing and email notification systems, which allowed users to filter
and receive notifications according to discriminatory criteria, also
made it an developer of the content for purposes of the CDA
5
5
The court explained that because Roommates.com "designed its
search system so it would steer users based on the preferences and
personal characteristics that Roommate itself forces subscribers to
disclose," it could not enjoy immunity for its use of such informa-
tion.'56 The court held that such use constituted "development"
under § 230.151
In coming to this conclusion, the majority took the "opportunity
to clarify two of [its] previous rulings regarding the scope of sec-
tion 230 immunity.0 5 The majority explained that its holding in
Batzel v. Smith, 159 that "an editor's minor changes to the spelling,
grammar and length of third-party content do not strip him of sec-
tion 230 immunity," is consistent with this concept of "development"
because none of the editor's "changes contributed to the libelous-
ness of the message ... .,,10 The majority also explained that it
"must clarify the reasoning undergirding [its] holding in Carafand'
because "we used language there that was unduly broad.''. The
majority explained that while it had correctly held that Match-
maker, the website, was immune under § 230, the court
"incorrectly suggested that it could never be liable because 'no
[dating] profile has any content until a user actively creates it.' ,,162
154. Id. at 1166.
155. Id. at 1167.
156. See id. ("If Roommate has no immunity for asking the discriminatory questions, as
we concluded above, it can certainly have no immunity for using the answers to the unlawful
questions to limit who has access to housing."(citations omitted)).
157. See id. at 1168-72.
158. Id. at 1170.
159. 333 F.3d 1018 (9th Cir. 2003).
160. Roommates.con II, 521 F.3d at 1170.
161. Id. at 1171.
162. Id.
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The majority went on to suggest that "a more plausible rationale
for the unquestionably correct result in Carafano is this ... [w] ith
respect to the defamatory content, the website operator was merely
as passive conduit .... " By contrast, the majority explained,
"Roommate both elicits the allegedly illegal content and makes
aggressive use of it in conducting its business. ' ' The majority,
however, for substantially the same reasons as the panel opinion,
declined to hold Roommate.com liable for any content provided in
the "Additional Essays" section.6 '
Three judges dissented to the majority's reasoning that Room-
mate.com "creat[ed] or develop[ed]" information by providing
preselected answers to mandatory questions and using that infor-
mation to filter and alert its users. 6  The dissent primarily took
issue with the majority's interpretation of phrase "creation or de-
velopment" with regard to the preferences. 167 The dissent first
explained that adding preselected answer choices to mandatory
questions does not "develop" information under the statute.6 8 The
dissent explained: "Roommate, with its prompts, is merely 'select-
ing material for publication,' which we have stated does not
constitute the 'development' of information. The profile is created
solely by the user, not the provider of the interactive website. In-
deed, without user participation, there is no information at all.'
69
Thus, relying on the very language in Carafano that the majority
distinguished, the dissent declared: "We got it right in Carafano,
that '[u]nder § 230(c) . .. so long as a third party willingly provides
the essential published content, the interactive service provider
receives full immunity regardless of the specific editing or selection
process.'""
The dissent then took issue with the majority's reasoning that
Roommate.com "create [ed] or develop [ed]" information by filter-
ing and using this information.' 7' The dissent noted that such an
application would impose liability on all interactive search engines
163. Id. at 1171-72.
164. Id. at 1172.
165. Id. at 1173-76.
166. Id. at 1182 ("A close reading of the statute leads to the conclusion that Roommate
is not an information content provider for two reasons: (1) providing a drop-down menu
does not constitute 'creating' or 'developing' information; and (2) the structure and text of
the statute make plain that Congress intended to immunize Roommate's sorting, displaying,
and transmitting of third-party information.").
167. Id.
168. Id.
169. Id. (citations omitted).
170. Id. at 1187.
171. Id. at 1182.
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and effectively obliterate CDA immunity.12 Furthermore, the dis-
sent explained that Roommate.com could not have "develop [ed]"
content by filtering, searching, sorting and transmitting informa-
tion because "Roommate made no changes to the information
provided to it by users.' 73 The dissent also suggested that other
courts have rejected such a theory of "development." 74 The dissent
explained: "Unsurprisingly, these courts reached the same com-
monsense solution that I reach here: § 230(c) (1) immunizes the
interactive service provider.','
75
III. PRESERVING IMMUNITY UNDER § 230
A. Partially User-Generated Content and ICSP Liability
After Roommates.com II
The Roommates. corn II decision illustrates the practical and phi-
losophical difficulties in evaluating § 230 immunity for ICSPs that
provide preselected answers to mandatory questions or develop a
business model around the use of such answers. The opinion's
precedential effect, however, contrary to the assertions of the dis-
sent, 76 appears to be quite limited. First, the holding is only
binding within the Ninth Circuit. Second, the en banc decision
appears to limit Roommate.com's liability to the use and solicita-
tion of predetermined answers to required questions "inducing
third parties to express illegal preferences."'' 7  Because merely "ask-
ing questions certainly can violate the [FHA] ," the complete en banc
panel agreed that Roommate.corn did not enjoy CDA immunity
from liability for asking such questions of its users. 7 The judges
disagreed, however, as to whether Roommate.com's actions in
(1) requiring users to select among preprepared answer choices to
172. Id. at 1183.
173. Id. at 1185.
174. Id.
175. Id.
176. See id. at 1176 ("The majority's unprecedented expansion of liability for Internet
service providers threatens to chill the robust development of the Internet that Congress
envisioned.").
177. See id. at 1165-72.
178. Id. at 1164, 1176 ("However, we note that asking questions certainly can violate the
Fair Housing Act and analogous laws in the physical world. For example, a real estate broker
may not inquire as to the race of a prospective buyer, and an employer may not inquire as to
the religion of a prospective employee. If such questions are unlawful when posed face-to-
face or by telephone, they don't magically become lawful when asked electronically online.
The Communications Decency Act was not meant to create a lawless no-man's-land on the
Internet.").
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mandatory questions and (2) using those answers to filter and clas-
sify its members made it an "information content provider" under
the CDA. The majority ultimately held that both actions made
Roommate.com an "information content provider":
Roommate designed its search system so it would steer users
based on the preferences and personal characteristics that
Roommate itself forces subscribers to disclose. If Roommate
has no immunity for asking the discriminatory questions, as
we concluded above, it can certainly have no immunity for us-
ing the answers to the unlawful questions to limit who has
access to housing.
179
Thus, for an ICSP to be an "information content provider" with
regard to partially user generated content, either for publication of
the selected information or the ICSP's use of the information, it
appears that the preprepared answer must itself express an illegal
preference. This likely limits the applicability of the holding to
those few cases, such as under the FHA, where merely expressing a
particular preference is illegal.8 °
Even assuming Roommates.com Ifs holding is limited to those
cases where preprepared answers themselves express an illegal
preference, the case's competing interpretations of "information
content provider" illustrate a larger philosophical inconsistency
lurking behind § 230 immunity with regard to partially user-
generated content. As noted supra, § 230 provides that "[n]o pro-
vider or user of an interactive computer service shall be treated as
the publisher or speaker of any information provided by another
information content provider."'8 ' An "information content pro-
vider" is "any person or entity that is responsible, in whole or in
part, for the creation or development of information provided
through the Internet or any other interactive computer service.'
82
Inserting this definition in the place of "information content pro-
vider" in the statute illustrates that a service provider can
simultaneously act as an "information content provider" while at
the same time enjoying immunity under the statute, so long as an-
other party ultimately "provide [s]" the information: no provider or
user of an interactive computer service shall be treated as the pub-
lisher or speaker of any information provided by any person or
179. Id.at1167.
180. The majority also mentioned race discrimination in educational and employment
opportunities. See Roommates.com I, 521 E3d at 1170 n.25.
181. 47 U.S.C. § 230(c)(1) (2008).
182. 47 U.S.C. § 230(0(3) (2008).
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entity that is responsible, in whole or in part, for the creation or
development of information provided through the Internet or any
other interactive computer service.
8 3
Assuming that selecting a preprepared answer constitutes at
least a partial "creation or development" of the information, 184 and
that information is "provided" by selecting an answer that other-
wise would not be published,1" an ICSP should enjoy immunity
under § 230 even if it is also considered an "information content
provider" with regard to the content. Thus, under the current
statutory language, courts should arguably evaluate ICSP immunity
from claims arising out of both entirely and partially user-
generated content on the basis of whether the ICSP is the sole "in-
formation content provider" of information it did not ultimately
"provide."'86 This battle is instead fought, however, with competing
definitions of "creation or development."
B. Roommates.com II: A Desirable Result Arguably
Inconsistent with Current Law
Many have criticized the Roommates.com II decision as misap-
plying the CDA immunity."7 The Roommates.com II court's arguable
183. Note that "another" is absent from this altered statute for grammatical reasons.
184. The Roommates.com II majority would not likely contest this assumption because it
embraced an expansive view of "development."
185. See Carafano v. Metrosplash.com, 339 F.3d 1119, 1124 (9th Cir. 2003) ("Under
§ 230(c) . .. so long as a third party willingly provides the essential published content, the
interactive service provider receives full immunity regardless of the specific editing or selec-
tion process.").
186. The majority opinion recognized the importance of this analysis noting both the real-
ity of multiple "information content providers" for any given information and the importance
of focusing on who ultimately "put[] information online." See Fair Hous. Council of San Fer-
nando Valley v. Roommates.com, LLC, 521 F.3d 1157, 1165 (9th Cir. 2008) (en banc)
(Roommates.com I) ("The dissent tilts at windmills when it shows, quite convincingly, that
Roommate's subscribers are information content providers who create the profiles by picking
among options and providing their own answers. There is no disagreement on this point. But,
the fact that users are information content providers does not preclude Roommate from also
being an information content provider by helping 'develop' at least 'in part' the information in
the profiles. As we explained in Batze, the party responsible for putting information online
may be subject to liability, even if the information originated with a user.").
187. See, e.g., Varty Defterderian, Note, Fair Housing Council v. Roommates.com: A New
Path for Section 230 Immunity, 24 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 563, 592 (2009) ("Despite over a dec-
ade of precedent and clear congressional intent, Roommates.com paved a new path to OSP
liability.... Though perhaps well intentioned, the majority not only created a hazier test for
immunity under section 230, but also overstepped its bounds."); Seth Stern, Note, Fair Hous-
ing and Online Free Speech Collide in Fair Housing Council of San Fernando Valley v.
Roommates.com, LLC, 58 DEPAUL L. REV. 559, 559 (2009) ("[T]he holding directly contradicts
precedent from the Ninth Circuit and other courts, as well as the clearly expressed goals of
the Communications Decency Act (CDA).").
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misapplication of § 230 notwithstanding, the result has common
sense appeal and represents a policy move in the right direction.
Applying § 230 as it is currently formulated and interpreted
88
would immunize Roommates.com for information selected by a
user regardless of the ICSP's level of meaningful "creation or de-
velopment" of discriminatory preferences in providing preselected
answers to mandatory questions or building a business model on
such preferences. 1 9 Thus, an ICSP could use § 230 immunity to
contravene the FHA's clear purpose to hold entities liable that
"print, or publish, or cause to be made, printed, or published" in-
formation with regard to a preference in renting a room.'9 0 This
level of immunity arguably extends, however, beyond the legislative
purposes behind § 230.'91 Courts hold print entities liable under
the FHA for merely printing such advertisements,' 92 and acknowl-
edge that there is "no cogent reason to narrow the meaning of that
language [of the FH-A]," absent clear intent otherwise.' 93 Congress
never explicitly considered § 230's potential conflict with the
FHA.
94
188. See Roommates.com II, 521 F.3d at 1176-77 (McKeown,J., concurring in part and dis-
senting in part) ("Now, with the stroke of a pen or, more accurately, a few strokes of the
keyboard, the majority upends the settled view that interactive service providers enjoy broad
immunity when publishing information provided by third parties.... The majority's deci-
sion, which sets us apart from five circuits, contravenes congressional intent and violates the
spirit and serendipity of the Internet.").
189. One could hypothetically imagine one preprovided answer to a single required
question. Under the statutory language as interpreted by the dissent, this service provider
would also enjoy immunity. Additionally, applying the statute as written may allow § 230
immunity where an interactive service provider is responsible for 99.99 percent of the actual
content development so long as it is "provided," i.e. selected, by a third party.
190. 42 U.S.C. § 3604(c) (2008). See supra note 105 and accompanying text.
191. See supra Part II.B.
192. See Chi. Lawyers' Comm. for Civ. Rights Under the Law, Inc. v. Craigslist, Inc., 461
F. Supp. 2d 681, 687 (N.D. IlI. 2006) ("[C]ourts have held that 42 U.S.C.S. § 3604(c) applies
to a variety of media, including newspapers, brochures, multiple listing services, telecom-
munication devices for the deaf, a housing complex's pool and building rules, as well as any
other publishing medium. Along the same lines, the United States Department of Housing
and Urban Development ('HUD') has issued a regulation construing Section 3604(c) as
applying to written notices and statements including any applications, flyers, brochures,
deeds, signs, banners, posters, billboards or any documents used with respect to the sale or
rental of a dwelling."(citations and quotations omitted)).
193. Ragin v. New York Times Co., 923 F.2d 995, 999 (2d Cir. 1991); United States v.
Hunter, 459 F.2d 205 (4th Cir. 1972).
194. See Chang, supra note 33, at 1011-12 ("Congress did not articulate any intention
that § 230 limit the applicability of the FHA's advertising provisions to OSPs, either in the
text of § 230 or at any point in its legislative history. This complete legislative silence suggests
not only that its members failed to realize that fair housing interests would be implicated at
all in the passage of § 230, but that Congress did not intend for the fair advertising man-
dates to be abrogated. With the integrity of the federal government's decades-long
commitment to equal housing opportunity hanging in the balance, Congress would not
have instituted such a far-reaching change without a single word of comment.").
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Furthermore, applying § 230 immunity to FHA claims where the
ICSP is an "information content provider" of discriminatory pref-
erences, by soliciting those preferences and searching, sorting, and
filtering on the basis of those preferences, arguably extends be-
yond the dual legislative goals of § 230: limiting the accessibility of
Internet indecency and encouraging Internet proliferation. 95 It is
difficult to imagine how allowing for ICSP immunity of FHA viola-
tions furthers the goal of limiting Internet access to indecent and
pornographic materials. Although one could argue that disallow-
ing § 230 immunity may stifle Internet growth, this is not an
insurmountable objection. The level of Internet communication
has increased significantly since the passing of the CDA, inherently
weakening the relevancy of this critique.96 Even so, narrowly limit-
ing § 230 immunity in this way may have little effect on legal
speech and future Internet growth.' 97
Whereas Roommates. corn II represents a policy move in the right
direction, it also represents a legally inconsistent stance given the
broad application of § 230 immunity.9 Although some scholars
have gone as far as suggesting that § 230 immunity does not apply
to § 3604(c) claims under the FHA, 99 this is contrary to practice
and the plain language of the statute.2 0 As noted by the Seventh
Circuit, although it may not always create the most desirable re-
sults, § 230 is a statute "l[t] hat covers ads for housing, auctions of
paintings that may have been stolen by Nazis, biting comments
about steroids in baseball, efforts to verify the truth of politicians'
195. See supra Part I.B.
196. See, e.g., Rachel Kurth, Note, Striking a Balance Between Protecting Civil Rights and Free
Speech on the Internet: The Fair Housing Act vs. The Communications Decency Act, 25 CARDOZO
ARTS & ENT. L.J. 805, 818 (2007) ("In 1996, the usage of the Internet was estimated at 40
million users worldwide. In 1999, the estimate had increased to more than 109 million users
in over 159 countries. In 2001, a survey announced the number of Internet users worldwide
to be 513.41 million." (citations omitted)).
197. Contra Fair Hous. Council of San Fernando Valley v. Roommates.com, LLC, 521
F.3d 1157, 1176-77 (9th Cir. 2008) (en banc) (Roommates.com 11) (McKeown, J., concurring
in part and dissenting in part) ("The majority's unprecedented expansion of liability for
Internet service providers threatens to chill the robust development of the Internet that
Congress envisioned. The majority condemns Roommate's 'search system,' a function that is
the heart of interactive service providers. My concern is not an empty Chicken Little 'sky is
falling' alert. By exposing every interactive service provider to liability for sorting, searching,
and utilizing the all too familiar drop-down menus, the majority has dramatically altered the
landscape of Internet liability. Instead of the 'robust' immunity envisioned by Congress,
interactive service providers are left scratching their heads and wondering where immunity
ends and liability begins.").
198. See generaUy Daniel Rockey, Could Your Web Site Be Liable for 'Contributing'to Unlawful
Conduct by Your Users?, 15 ANDREWS INTELLECTUAL PROP. LITIG. REP. 12 (2008).
199. See Chang, supra note 33, at 1012.
200. See Chi. Lawyers' Comm. for Civ. Rights Under the Law, Inc. v. Craigslist, 519 F.3d
666, 671 (7th Cir. 2008).
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promises, and everything else that third parties may post on a web
site .... ,,21' Thus, under current law, an ICSP's § 230 immunity
likely extends to partially user-created content that would other-
wise constitute an FHA violation. Therefore, to hold an ICSP
responsible for partially user-generated content that violates the
FHA, Congress must amend § 230.
C. A House Divided: Making § 2 30(c) Compatible with the FHA
Congress should amend § 230 to account for relevant counter
interests in fair housing advertisement on the Internet. A number
of commentators have called for action.2  Some have proposed
limiting § 230 immunity to situations not involving housing.203 Al-
though such a proposal preserves the relevant interests in fair
housing advertisement on the Internet, it does so by completely
abolishing § 230 immunity for any housing information posted on
the Internet, whether completely or partially user-generated.2 4
Practically, this means that service providers will be subject to the
same liability as print entities. Although there is inherent appeal in
uniform liability between print and electronic entities, this solution
ignores the purposes behind § 230 immunity in allowing ICSPs
freedom to edit obscene postings without incurring traditional
publisher liability.205 Any legislative response should be consistent
with the underlying goals of the FHA and § 230.
Congress should amend § 230 accordingly: "No provider or user
of an interactive computer service shall be treated as the publisher
or speaker of any information provided by another information
content provider, except for content with respect to the sale or rental of a
housing unit in which the interactive computer service provider also acts as
an information content provider." This proposal is more narrowly tai-
lored to serve the purposes of both the FHA and § 230.206 Under
201. Id. at 671.
202. See Chang, supra note 33, at 1012; Collins, supra note 25, at 1495; Duran, supra note
75.
203. See Collins, supra note 25, at 1495 (proposing to abolish an ICSP's § 230 immunity
with regard to both completely and partially user-generated content: "No provider or user of
an interactive computer service shall be treated as the publisher or speaker of any informa-
tion provided by another information content provider, except for notices, statements, or
advertisements with respect to the sale or rental of a dwelling.").
204. Although Collins suggests that this proposal would not impose "excessive" burdens
on providers who edit content, without § 230 immunity, such editing would in fact subject a
provider to common law publisher liability specifically rejected by the language and ration-
ale of§ 230. See id. at 1496-97; supra Part IA
205. See supra Part I.B.
206. Id.
[VOL. 43:3
SPRING 2010]
this proposal, an ICSP would enjoy § 230 immunity unless it is "re-
sponsible, in whole or in part, for the creation or development" of
the objectionable housing advertisement. Consistent with the legis-
lative purposes behind § 230, an ICSP could edit obscene posts
with immunity, including housing advertisements, so long as it did
not participate in the "creation or development" of the FHA violat-
ing post, thus discouraging service providers from facilitating FHA
violations via the Internet.
207
This proposal would not likely alter the outcome in the Room-
mates.com II case. However, it would provide a cogent reason for
that outcome and a clearer standard for evaluating an ICSP's po-
tential liability for partially user-generated content. Even so, this
proposal is not without objection . 2 0 First, his proposal does not
create complete uniformity between print and online entities with
regard to FHA liability.209 Second, this proposal assumes that, the
soundness of its legal reasoning aside, Roommates. com II produced a
desirable outcome. 2 '0 Finally, this proposal still requires a court to
determine initially whether an ICSP is an "information content
provider" with regard to objectionable housing information. This
task invariably requires a consistent interpretation of what ICSP
actions are sufficient to constitute "creation or development" un-
der the statute. Competing interpretations of this phrase was the
real sticking point between the majority and dissent in Room-
mates.com II. Therefore, Congress should also amend the definition
of "information content provider" to acknowledge the obvious
"creation or development" with respect to ICSP created dropdown
answers to mandatory questions.
The prospective burden of the proposed reform on courts
appears small, as they make determinations regarding a party's
status as an "information content provider" under the current case
law interpretation of the statute. 21 Admittedly, this proposal does
preserve immunity with regard to housing information for Internet
entities to a larger degree than that available to similarly situated
print entities. Although greater uniformity is possible, and may
207. See Chang, supra note 33.
208. See Collins, supra note 25, at 1495-98 (addressing the most common objections to
limiting § 230(c)).
209. Some have suggested a restoration of common law distributor liability regarding
Internet providers. See, e.g., Chi. Lawyers' Comm. for Civ. Rights Under the Law, Inc. v.
Craigslist, Inc., 461 F. Supp. 2d 681, 698 (N.D. Il1. 2006).
210. See generally Jon Burns, Recent Development, Doe v. SexSearch.com: Placing Real-
Life Liability Back Where It Belongs in a Virtual World, 9 N.C. J.L. & TECH. 69 (2007); Rockey,
supra note 198; Cecilia Ziniti, The Optimal Liability System for Online Service Providers: How Ze-
ran V. America Online Got It Right and Web 2.0 Proves It, 23 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 583 (2008).
211. See, e.g., supra notes 64, 89, 99 and accompanying text.
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even be desired, this proposal strikes a level of immunity more true
to the stated goals of the conflicting statutes.
IV. CONCLUSION
Congress enacted 47 U.S.C. § 230 to encourage Internet service
providers to self-regulate Internet indecency and obscenity.212 This
section explicitly provides ICSPs immunity from traditional pub-
lisher liability and courts have interpreted this immunity
sweepingly.212 However, difficult issues arise when courts are asked
to parse the nuances of exactly which activities rise to the level of
"information content provider" and which do not. This analysis is
further complicated when § 230 immunity clashes with other
strongly held societal values. Roommates.com II provides an interest-
ing, and relatively aberrant, illustration of a court rejecting an
exceedingly broad application § 230 immunity in applying fair
housing regulations.1 4
The result in Roommates.corn II, although ultimately desirable, is
arguably inconsistent with the language and interpretation of § 230.
Congress should amend § 230, as proposed supra, to limit immunity
in circumstances where the ICSP is an "information content pro-
vider" with respect to an objectionable housing advertisement.
215
Congress should also amend the definition of "information content
provider" to include an ICSP's use of ICSP-created dropdown an-
swers to mandatory questions, where such answers "materially
contribute to alleged illegality of the conduct. 2 1 6 This proposal is
narrowly tailored to better serve the purposes of the FHA and § 230
than the current statutory language. Although this proposal is not
perfect, in that it preserves some inconsistency between print and
Internet entities and is based on the assumption that nondiscrimina-
tory Internet housing advertisements should be discouraged at the
cost of curtailing some Internet immunity, it achieves a level of im-
munity more true to the stated goals of the conflicting statutes and is
therefore preferable to the current regime.
212. See supra Part I.B.
213. See supra Part I.C.
214. See supra Part II.C.
215. See supra Part III.C.
216. See Fair Hous. Council of San Fernando Valley v. Roommates.com, LLC, 521 F.3d
1157, 1168 (9th Cir. 2008) (en banc) (Roommates.com fl).
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